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ABSTRACT 
OnLine Social Networking sites (SNS) hold a vast amount of information that individuals and organisations post 
about themselves. Investigations include SNS as sources of evidence and the challenge is to have effective tools to 
extract the evidence. In this exploratory research we apply the latest version of a proprietary tool to identify potential 
evidence from five SNS using three different browsers. We found that each web browser influenced the scope of the 
evidence extracted. In previous research we have shown that different open source and proprietary tools influence 
the scope of evidence obtained. In this research we asked, What variation in the scope of evidence extraction can be 
expected between different browsers? The implications of this exploratory research is for precaution. The choice of 
a web browser used to investigate a SNS directly influences the scope of digital evidence obtained.     
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INTRODUCTION 
Online social networks are forums hosted on the Internet that provide easiness and effectiveness for unlimited amounts 
of users to share information in digital forms such as images, texts, links, audios, and videos. In simple terms they are 
massive communication platforms (Cheung and Lee, 2010). The use social media has become pervasive in the lives 
of many users and an extension of their real lives. There are many different online social networks with different 
purposes of use but all communicate information about the individual, the organisation and their networks of 
association. The largest one Facebook had over 1.5 billion users in May 2015 (Chen, Xu, Yuan, and Shashidar, 2015). 
Many users of these sites have become psychologically attached to the interaction and the self-promotion to a point 
where they freely post information about themselves, including pictures, status, comments, locations, beliefs, opinions 
and feelings. Some of these communications may be exaggerations or fabricated using information tools but many 
users are simply conveying stories in various forms about themselves, the organisation and their communities ( ). The 
nature of the medium provides a sense of security and personal safety in which the constraints of normal social settings 
are often absent. In this context much information is available that would not always be accessible by standard 
investigation techniques such as interviews and observations. In a standard interview situation cues are present that 
can inhibit or facilitate conversation and the recollect of events. The proximity of relationships in such situations often 
colours the tone and texture of what is recorded. In the online situation the spatial proximity of others may be distant 
or non-existent. The user conveys their own ideas and beliefs about matters in a mobile non-space with only the 
influence of the online community and perceptions of others built up from previous experience of online interaction. 
In some instances the user is conveying information on behalf of others such as business advertising or 
communications for those without an account but in every instance the user mediates the situation. As such the user 
is in a position of power, can earn trust and can act as an authority in matters unknown. In simple terms the user feels 
important and capable to declare truths (Wang, Woo, Lui, Quak, Yang, 2012). 
From a forensic point of view, online social networks are a potential source of evidence that can help during 
investigation (Yue et al., 2014). There are many instances where employers, statuary authorities and others have 
consulted social networking evidence before making judgements (Zainudin et al., 2010). Organisations have also 
encouraged members to maintain social network sites to communicate and promote brand (Dar and Shah, 2013). 
Many work performance appraisals include both positive and negative feedback based on online social performance 
(Mingming, 2014). These feedback are based on “likes”, numbers of followers, numbers of retweets, and so on. As a 
consequence there is a huge amount of data available online surrounding individuals and any other created entity such 
as political parties, brands, clubs, charities, and so on.  The access to some of the data is controlled by privacy settings 
and privileges but in general there is an enormous amount of data available. Not surprisingly searching and sorting 
through the entangled medium is a big part of digital investigation. Social engineering has also played a role in 
weakening the protections of privacy and often social networks that are perceived to be secure are only as strong as 
the weakest link who may decide to disclose sensitive information. Publically reported cases of mass hacking of 
passwords has led to the disclosure of sensitive documents, images and audio clips that were only intended for the 
select social group (Zhang, Choudhary, and Grudin, 2014). All of these matters show that online social networks 
contain a multiplicity of evidence that can be accessed in many ways. The evidential value is moderated by the 
potential for over-inflated claims, digital make-overs and flaring; but the amount of data available and the 
improvement in extraction and analysis tools is making the source unavoidable. 
This paper is structured to review previous literature, define the test set up and to report the results. The focus of the 
research is to identify the effect the use of a particular web browser has on the scope of evidence. The results are then 
discussed to elicit the implications for practice. The conclusion is that social networking site (SNS) digital forensic 
tools have to be used with caution and the interpretation of findings moderated to allow for variations caused by web 
browser effects and tool effects.   
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
The introductory section has defined and described the characteristics of SNS. This section is concerned with the 
identification of evidence that may be found on a SNS. The opportunity to collect evidence from SNS is no different 
than any other digital forensic collection activity and it must comply with standardised criteria for acceptance. The 
five Daubert criteria are often cited as helpful guidelines for assuring evidence (Cohen, 2010). Although these are 
certainly helpful overriding guidelines for technical performance, legislation in the form of a jurisdiction Evidence 
Act, for example, may take priority. If the evidence has been collected in an unacceptable social sense where coercion 
has been used or reasonable privacy breeched; or where spoliation may have occurred, then the evidence becomes 
unacceptable (Jang and Kwok, 2014). The investigator has to comply both with the IT technical criteria, the legal 
framework and due processes to assure admissibility. In the following two sub sections the previous literature on SNS 
tool testing is reviewed and the type of digital evidence available summarised. 
Tool Evidence Collection 
In previous literature variations between tool performances for extracting digital evidence from SNS have been 
reported. The findings show that the capability of three widely available tools for evidence extraction in SNS varied 
greatly under test conditions. The experiment was set up using standardised tool testing algorithms (see Table 1). The 
capabilities of digital forensic tools to perform examination and extraction of social networking artefacts was 
measured. The overall top performing tool was EnCase Forensic which was able to automatically examine and extract 
an average of 89.6% of all SNS artefacts. It also had a perfect rating of 3/3 for all test cases. The comprehensive 
Internet history search was a useful technique to isolate SNS related artefacts and in two scenarios the provided 
scripting language EnScript was use to code and facilitate the extraction.  
Table 1. Test Cases for Forensic Tool Testing 
Test Case # Test Case Name Tested Tool Functionality 
TC01 SNS History Analysis Provide detailed list of SNS URLs accessed. 
TC02 Web Browser Cache Analysis Automatically examine and decode Web browser cache for 
SNS information, data and files. 
TC03 SNS Session Analysis Locate Internet session artefacts created by SNS interaction. 
TC04 Facebook Chat Analysis Automatically examine evidence for Facebook chat 
messages. 
TC05 Repeatability & Reproducibility Tool achieves same results consistently. 
CacheBack also performed well at automatically examining SNS artefacts, with an average of 75.2% of all artefacts 
extracted. Internet Evidence Finder (IEF) is designed to be run on a live system, and did not process static forensic 
image files as used in the testing. The result was a poor performance and the requirement to mount the forensic image 
for evidence extraction. These results all have implication for evidence scope. Each of the three tools also faced 
challenges in the area of web browser compatibility and interoperability. Table 2 summarises the performance 
findings. 
Table 2. Summary of Findings: Automated Examination Capabilities of Tools 
Scenario 
CacheBack IEF EnCase 
Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating 
TC01 58.2% 2 21.4% 1 93.2% 3 
TC02 31.8% 1 0.6% 1 87.8% 3 
TC03 86.1% 3 0% 0 92% 3 
TC04 100% 3 50% 2 75% 3 
TC05 100% 3 100% 3 100% 3 
Total Weighted 75.2% 12 34.4% 7 89.6% 15 
Ranking 2nd 3rd  1st 
 
The Type of Evidence Stored In A SNS 
The type of data that can be found in SNS is impressive. We have listed categories in previous articles but a short 
review would include the following. Five working categories are (Mumba and Venter, 2014):  
Service data: Data that has to be provided by users to continue using the social network site, examples of data 
is legal name, Date of Birth, and phone numbers and so on.  
Disclosed data: Any data posted by the account user, it could be presented in any format such as pictures, 
videos, links, comments, and updating status.  
Entrusted data: Any data posted by someone else to a user account (friends, subscribers, followers etc.). The 
difference between Disclosed and Entrusted data is that the user does not have control over the entrusted data 
once it’s been posted.  
Incidental data: Incidental data is what other people write in their account about a particular user. Again the 
data could be anything, pictures, messages, videos, and so on. 
Behavioural data: The data collected by the site about users’ practises and habits. By recording their activities, 
choices, regular habits, points of views and so on.      
The types of evidence can vary from one SNS to another depending on their architecture and the features provided. 
The different data sources that that can be collected from online social networks, which may lead to acceptable 
evidence during a forensic investigation can be grouped into five areas (Zainudin, Merabti and Jones, 2010).  
Social footprint with other users, including friend lists, connected groups, who are the followers, and 
following who. 
Communications methods between the users within the site, e.g. private messages, instant messenger, 
comments, likes, group communications, and events.  
Pictures and videos posted by the users, and who were tagged in the pictures, what other pictures a certain 
user was tagged on. 
The times of activities: when a specific user logged on into the site, and what sort of activities were performed 
in a specific time frame. 
The applications used by the user, and identifying the purpose of the used apps, and what information can be 
deduce in the social context. 
The evidence may be spread in a variety of locations some of which may be inaccessible. Online social networking 
sites exploit the services of cloud providers leaving potential sources of information lost in the complexity of 
commercial arrangements and service level agreements. A traditional investigation would have relied on browser 
forensic techniques to access a large percentage of the potential evidence on a user’s hard drive. However the newer 
information architectures suggest that RAM dumping and cloud investigation techniques are also required.  
TEST SETUP 
The research is to investigate the variation in scope of different web browsers to extract digital evidence. The test 
context was the University laboratory using one PC and the network that is available to all University users. Each web 
browser was checked for the standard out of the box configurations before use. In this way we sought to generalise 
the experience any user may have on the network when accessing the five SNS with the three different web browsers. 
The test environment was set up using accounts created for the purpose of the research on five different SNS 
(Facebook; Twitter; Instagram; Linkin; Bayt). Consequently the data reported is all fictitious scenario based and with 
no real owners. Three web browsers were tested to observe the scope of evidence extraction. The web browsers were 
selected from the four most popular web browsers in 2015 (Statcounter.com, 2015). The popularity rank was reported 
as Chrome (50%), Internet Explorer (IE) (12%), Firefox (10%), Safari (13%). Consequently Chrome, Firefox and IE 
were selected based on availability and platform. The techniques from Browser Forensic investigation were employed, 
such as RAM dumping, Cache analysis from the PC, and so on.  In figure 1 the phases of investigation are shown to 
communicate the scope of enquiry. The focus was on site evidence availability and web browser extraction capability.  
The researchers played case scenarios to populate the sites with potential evidence and also to control the amount and 
type of data for discovery before the tests began. In this way the web browsers could be assessed against the potential 
evidence present and ranked. In the first phase the IT artefacts were defined and the data types identified and posted. 
The second phase determined the tests and scenarios. The evidence was subsequently stored on a hard drive and in 
the PC 8Gb RAM. In phase three the hard drive was imaged and the RAM dumped for analysis in Phase 4. Phase 5 
was the research report. The Third phase acquisition and extraction of evidence was performed based on NIST forensic 
best practice guidelines. The Fourth phase included a reconstruction of the evidence against the research scenarios 
(see figure 1). The following hardware and software were used: 
• Darik and Nuke wiping utility tool for zeroing the suspect hard drive before conducting the scenarios 
(Generating the controlled data).  
• Windows 7 professional with 32-bit Operating System is installed on the suspect computer, and latest 
versions of IE, Chrome, and Firefox.  
• FTK imager light 3.1.1: used for acquiring RAM memory of suspect’s computer.  
• AccessData® FTK® Imager 2.9.0.138: used for creating an image of memory dump and the acquired hard 
drives and to verify the integrity of the image by calculating MD5 and SHA1 values.  
• Tableau eSATA forensic bride: A forensic SATA/IDE bridge model T35es is used to acquire computer hard 
drive in forensic manner where the evidence is not altered or changed.  
• Tableau Imager 1.11: To acquire the computer’s hard with the use of tableau eSATA forensic bridge.  
• Belkasoft Evidence Center 7.3: used for analyzing OSNs evidence from the suspect’s computer. 
 
 
Figure 1. Research Phases  
THE RESULTS 
The experiment confirms that the types and amounts of data that can be found in SNSs is large. It is also 
comprehensive and descriptive. However, the results show that not all data can be accessed and that different web 
browsers find different and different amounts of data. In the experiment some of the posted data was not found at all. 
The RAM, pagefile.sys, and hard drive were all searched for evidence and because we had set the experiment up 
knowing what could be found the web browser limitations became explicit. The figure 2 summarizes the percentage 
of forensic evidence found with each web browser. The data is further differentiated into SNS (colour code) and 
location. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Forensic Evidence found from difference sources and different web browsers  
DISCUSSION 
The results in figure 2 show considerable variation between web browsers and SNS when evidence discovery is 
required. Each web browser was configured and used in the fashion described in the set up section. Across the three 
web browsers Firefox and Chrome performed effectively for the SNS Twitter but did not show any remarkable 
performances for the other four SNS. Internet Explorer similarly stood out as underperforming on all SNS. It can be 
argued that Internet Explorer was more consistent across the five SNS than the other two web browsers but in terms 
of a high 95% or better discovery rate, it fell well short. The results from the study have to be read with the limitations 
described in the set up section and the best advice to a Digital Forensic Investigator is cautioned with these limitations. 
In practice the results suggest that a range of web browsers should be used to provide the best scope of discovery and 
Internet Explorer can provide a baseline from which to work. The consistency across SNS and storage devices 
suggests that affair indication of where to look may be established. Once the baseline is set then a Digital Forensic 
Investigator can use other web browsers to search more thoroughly in the target areas.  
The tools a digital investigator uses for extracting evidence from a SNS determine the scope of the evidence acquired. 
Previously published experimental results show that the choice of evidence extraction and analysis tools sets 
determine what is found from a SNS. In this research the experiment shows that the scope is further influenced by the 
type of SNS, the web browser and where the evidence is stored. The results showed that the easiest SNS to extract 
evidence was Instagram and the hardest LinkedIn. Other extreme variations were noted when Firefox and Chrome 
web browsers were used on the Bayt SNS. The extraction of evidence from different locations is consistent across the 
RAM, pagefily.sys and hard drive for Internet explorer but variable for Chrome and Firefox. This suggests that again 
the web browser used by the investigator is to impact the scope of evidence obtained. The clear message from figure 
2 analysis is that with the exception of Instagram over 50% of the structured evidence was not extracted by any of the 
three web browsers in the experiment. This is a very large proportion and of material influence when reporting 
evidence obtained from a SNS. A professional investigator is to demonstrate in practice the scientific methods used 
to extract the evidence so another can extract the same evidence using the same methods. However it is problematic 
that if another expert using the same web browser with the same configurations would find the same evidence or if a 
different web browser performed the same method the same evidence would be extracted. 
The implications of these findings is for further caution and preparation by investigators when collecting evidence 
from SNS. The technical report of findings has to include a specification of the web browser(s) used and the version 
numbers so that another expert can best chance replicate the method and procedures to obtain the same evidence. 
More worrying however, is the potential for Judges and Juries to simply take evidence extracted from SNS at face 
value and assume it has the same status as digital evidence from traditional sources. SNS introduce extra layers of 
complexity that may not yet be fully understood and planned for in digital evidence extraction. The extent and 
limitations currently found in digital evidence extraction tools and web browsers can seriously limited the scope of 
what may be obtained. An incomplete picture of an event may provide items of interest but cannot tell the whole 
story. In addition the way people can behave online places limitations on the value of the evidence. Previously 
mentioned behaviours such as flaring, bragging, serialising, fantasising and so on limit the reality factor associated 
with any posted data. Such semantic slippage and detached referrals may fuel a defence case that alleges planting of 
evidence and the fabricating of charges. The worst case situation leaves an SNS user vulnerable to a multiplicity of 
theories of the evidence and consequently accountable to unrelated accusations. The implications of these findings is 
for caution when extracting and reporting evidence from SNS. An investigator may use multiple tools and web 
browsers but still has to accept that a comprehensive search of a SNS for evidence remains incomplete. 
CONCLUSION 
There are many cases where people have used online social networks to reveal their admission of committing offenses. 
Often the motivation is to brag or to seek popularity. The social networks people disclose online also have the links 
to others who influence their behaviour and those with whom they exert influence. Of course there are many strengths 
of relationship within any online social network but the nature of trust and apparent removal of the usual barriers to 
expression allows the disclosure of important information. In this research we show that caution must be taken when 
evidence is extracted and reported from SNSs. The performance variations between the web browsers tested were 
significant and indicative of the potential web browser effect impact. The conclusions provide a warning for 
professional practice and increased awareness for potential loss and spoliation of evidence when investigating SNS. 
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